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Chapter I 
 Introduction 
Civic participation has always been a critical element in American life. 
From cooking clubs to the Common Council, Americans make themselves 
part of something more meaningful – at least, numerically – than they are 
individually by joining various associations. It is part of the citizens’ First 
Amendment right, the constitutional provision that permits people to 
“peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.” While citizens do not only assemble to protest or call on the 
government for change, this freedom to associate – in itself – is an intrinsic 
part of a democratic government and American livelihood. It is a way to 
express views and engage with others, particularly with complex nebulous 
structures like the local, state, or federal government. It is a way for citizens to 
inform public officials about opinions. It is a way to fraternize with others 
who hold similar beliefs. It is part of what determines the laws of the land and 
American cultural norms.  
Yet in recent years, political apathy has increased and voter turnout has 
plummeted. Even during the hyped-up 2008 presidential elections, which 
marked the first election of an African-American president and yielded a 64 
percent turnout for voting-age citizens, nearly half of survey respondents 
agreed that people do not have a say in what the government does, according 
to American National Elections Studies. Many citizens are losing confidence 
that their voices can make any political impact. This poses a tremendous 
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problem for a system of government that relies on citizen participation in the 
election of its public officials, to name one issue.  
In this paper, I contend that the growing role of money from wealthy 
individuals and special interest groups, which contribute to election 
campaigns and expect political favors in exchange, has thwarted our 
policymaking process. I begin by outlining how 1) civic engagement has been 
the bedrock of American democracy and proceed by arguing that 2) the rise of 
the corporate state has sparked the downfall of an accountable political system 
that is accessible and responsive to all voters. Thereafter, I assert that 3) the 
increased influence of corporate money in politics has only magnified this 
political flaw. In conclusion, I propose that 4) one effective method for 
boosting civic engagement and restoring faith in a democratic government is 
campaign finance reform, through which elections would become publicly 
financed. This would strengthen a participatory democracy that is responsive 
to the average voter, rather than one manipulated by corporate interests that 
can donate significantly more to election campaigns than the vast majority of 
the American public.  
 
Chapter II 
 Civic Engagement as the Bedrock of American Democracy 
 
Before I delve into my discussion of the instrumental role civic 
engagement plays in American democracy, it is imperative to examine the 
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historical roots of the political framework that have fueled this participation in 
the United States.  
Through what has been characterized as “the most complex constitutional 
system in the world,” the American government has been attempting to 
balance the tension between democracy and elitism since the 1787 
Constitutional Convention, when the structure of an unparalleled political 
system emerged, after much bargaining and compromise from the parties 
involved. As described by the Framers in Federalist #10,  
To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of a 
faction, and the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of a popular 
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. 
 
This system, typified by the Madisonian Model, is based on the separation 
of powers, checks and balances, and overlapping centers of political power. 
The Madisonian Model aims to balance elite and mass interests, in addition to 
regulation and participation of American citizenry. Deliberate institutional 
mechanisms, embedded in the Constitution since its ratification in 1789, try to 
stabilize these tensions through arrangements like the separation of powers 
within different levels of government – between central and state/local 
governments, as well as among the three branches of national government – 
checks and balances among the executives, legislative and judicial branches, 
and the intertwining spheres of political authority. The last of these is most 
precisely termed “shared federalism.” 1  
                                                        
1 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of American 
Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
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To comprehend why the Framers fashioned the Madisonian Model in the 
form it originated, it is essential to briefly address the political and economic 
conditions that pervaded the country in the late 18th century. Gaining 
independence from the British crown in 1776, Americans, some critics may 
argue, took their newly acquired freedom to the extreme at first, much like 
people tend to binge on junk food after restrictive diets. The Founders created 
a “highly decentralized system, in which the national government derives 
limited authority from the states rather than directly from citizens”, embodied 
by the Articles of Confederation. As some note, “their suspicion of national 
authority very nearly cost the fledgling nation its independence”2. The 
newfound confederation assigned so little authority to the central government 
– for instance, amendments in direct taxation required unanimous agreement 
by states to be effected – that it proved futile in military coordination and 
funding during the war with Britain. Thirteen states faced many collective 
action problems, such as transaction costs in attempting to manage local 
affairs single-handedly and supplying public goods like defense and 
commercial markets. Furthermore, there were “contagious levels of free 
riding” 3 because the confederation lacked an overarching body of power that 
could mandate a tax for all states. Thus, the few states that yielded their share 
were exploited by the states that did not, so many states received “free meals” 
                                                        
2 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of American 
Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
 
3 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of American 
Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
 
5 
 
 
at the expense of others. When British troops were defeated in Yorktown, 
Virginia, with France’s aid, America prevailed in the Revolution but remained 
with a declining economy and domestic and international trade barriers due to 
a lack of a strong central government. Specifically,  
The nation’s shaky finances were not helped by its trade problems, which 
also stemmed from the confederation’s explicit reservation of all matters 
of commerce to the states … Congress lacked the authority to negotiate 
credible trade agreements with other nations. 4 
 
To paraphrase, since the states held the purse strings and there was no 
cardinal enforcement device to oblige them to collaborate and contribute, the 
states “individually confronted a classic prisoner’s dilemma: No state would 
contribute its share of the revenue so long as it suspected one or more of the 
other states might not.” This can be linked to the Tragedy of the Commons, 
namely the idea that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” 5 To clarify, 
the unrestrained freedom the states had eventually drew the entire 
confederation into a dire economic situation. Without some control over every 
state, all were likely to collapse as they hurt one another through collective 
action discords. To boot, because of Congress’ inability to implement 
economic policies and regulate commerce in its own nation, it lost the 
international credibility needed to compete on a global scale. As a result of 
these economic woes, exacerbated by political instability, popular discontent 
                                                        
4 P 58. Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
 
5 Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162 (1968): 1243-
248. Web. 18 Apr. 2012. <http://dieoff.org/page95.htm>. 
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mounted, culminating in the 1786 Shays’ Rebellion. This rebellion 
symbolized the very expression of “excessive democracy” the Framers feared. 
Indeed, “Shays’ Rebellion represented a wildfire threatening to sweep the 
country into anarchy,” 6and it “mobilized the states behind constitutional 
reform.” 7  
Now that I have contextualized, I will concisely cover some of the 
Framers’ concerns as they crafted the Madisonian Model. Primarily, they were 
alarmed by the tyranny of faction. The Framer after whom this model is 
named, James Madison, interpreted this principle: 
…As a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. [Federalist #10] 
 
In other words, the Framers were concerned with self-interested groups 
that would relentlessly bulldoze their agenda regardless of the repercussions 
this might have on the public, even if this infringed on citizen rights or hurt 
the welfare of the state. Similarly, Madison stipulated that “measures are too 
often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor 
party, but by the superior force of … an overbearing majority” [Federalist 
#10]. The Framers believed that one of the greatest catalysts of this arbitrary 
majority action was a “pure democracy,” which would encourage “popular 
                                                        
6 p. 61 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
7 P. 59 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
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passions” to diffuse and eventually interfere with the wellbeing of society. As 
Madison observed,  
…Such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or 
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as 
they have been violent in their deaths. [Federalist #10]. 
 
It is almost as though the Framers were redefining the meaning of 
democracy by implying there is more than one kind of democracy. Pushing 
for this shift from a direct democracy to a representative one, the Framers 
repeatedly stressed that “an encompassing national [republic] would be less 
susceptible to the influence of factions than would state governments,” due to 
its size and diversity (an auxiliary precaution, with which it becomes more 
difficult to organize the tyrannical majority the founders were so apprehensive 
of). Another reason for establishing a representative democracy was “to 
redefine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of 
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country” [Federalist #10]. Some may contend that this in itself was an 
elitist idea that aimed to serve the interests of medium’s occupants, as if 
public views need to be filtered by a more refined and well-bred outlooks that 
ordinary men lacked. 
 What’s also noteworthy is that Madison touched on the subject of 
property in The Federalist Papers, which bears significance in that the Framers 
themselves occupied the propertied privileged class. As some critics explain, 
“representing a cross section of the nation’s propertied interests, the framers 
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feared the threat which growing democratization posed for their social and 
economic livelihood.” Madison seemed to reaffirm this in Federalist #10, 
“…the most common and durable source of faction has been the various 
unequal distribution of property.” Based on the attention the Framers allocated 
toward power and property, the Framers might have been more preoccupied 
with keeping their privileged socioeconomic statuses “rather than [satisfying] 
the needs of the populace.” Some historians support the argument that “their 
goal was to construct a centralized power to serve the expanding interests of 
the manufacturing, commercial, land-owning, and financial classes.” Whether 
due to the economic conditions permeating the confederation, the historical 
circumstances leading up to it, the Framers’ political and economic interests, 
their concern with the tyranny of faction, their fear of social unrest, or a 
combination of some or all of these factors, the Framers used the Shays’ 
Rebellion to their advantage: as an opportunity to persuade the Anti-
Federalists to nationalize the country. 8 
We will now take a short aside to outline the institutional mechanisms the 
Framers championed for, to further illustrate their endeavor to balance the 
tension between elitism and democracy, particularly their attempt to mitigate 
the popular passions and tyranny of faction they feared would emerge from an 
“uncontrolled” democracy. The founders of the American government clearly 
attempted by limitations on their powers of government and by the separation 
                                                        
8
 p. 39 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St. 
Martin's, 1983. Print. 
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of the branches of government, to avoid the “unbridled power of a majority.”  
9These mechanisms include the separation of powers between different levels 
of government and checks and balances. Madison and other leading political 
thinkers of the time believed that “the accumulation of all powers legislative, 
executive, and judiciary in the same hands … may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny” [Federalist #47]. To elucidate further, the Framers 
argued that the concentration of all national power in one branch would lead 
to corruption, since one leader would retain all control and would not depend 
on other branches to thrive and function properly. Therefore, the Framers 
were determined in “so contriving the interior structure of the government as 
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, by the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places” (another auxiliary precaution) 
[Federalist #51].  
Resultantly, today the United States has three separate but interrelated 
branches of national government, with constitutional provisions that protect 
each level from encroachments by others. At the same time, each branch has 
leverage over others, so it is in each branch’s interest to cooperate with the 
other two. The Framers were arguably most concerned with the connections of 
the legislative branch to its constituencies -- out of personal motives, some 
counter -- so in the Great Compromise, the resolution produced a bicameral 
legislature, with the lower chamber’s representation based on population and 
                                                        
9 Griffin, Clare E. The Free Society. Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1965. Print. 
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upper chamber’s representation equal for every state. Overall, Congressional 
power heightened after the Constitution was ratified, especially due to the 
commerce clause, which permitted Congress to regulate all trade, and the 
necessary and proper clause, which “left the door open for a major expansion 
of Congress’s legislative power.” 10 To “insulate the executive and judicial 
branches and enlist them in containing any efforts by the states through the 
Senate to subvert national policy”11, Madison embarked on designing 
independent executive and judiciary branches, each equipped with 
constitutional means to exercise checks and balances over the other. 
Specifically, the executive branch was granted veto power, enabling the 
president to nullify any legislative outcome. In turn, Congress is allowed to 
override a presidential veto, but only after a supermajority is reached in both 
houses (2/3). The Supreme Court is, some suggest, underestimated in its 
power – the Constitution grants it the final jurisdiction in resolving differences 
between state and national governments, it has the supremacy clause, and ever 
since the landmark Marbury v. Madison (1803), it has the right to judicial 
review. This authorizes it to overturn any federal laws and executive actions it 
deems unconstitutional 12.  
But again, some critics offer that the end product of the Constitution – this 
Madisonian Model – is an elitist contrivance. For instance, the Framers 
                                                        
10 67 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
11 69 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
12 72-73 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of 
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print. 
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evidently did not want to promote amendments to the Constitutions or major 
transformations in the government instigated by the general public. As 
Madison emphasized in Federalist #49, this would render the government 
unstable or untrustworthy, causing disorder in society – or so he eloquently 
argued. Others may assert that this was a justification to forge the path for 
“rational” leaders and doctrines, while weeding others out as they painted an 
illusion of public participation through methods like regular elections. 
Whatever the measure of actual impact, the Framers realized from the start it 
was important for American citizens – most of whom had fled from 
oppression in Europe – at least feel like they have some level of influence in 
political life and society at large. 
One of the first people who noted this was a visitor to this country. This 
19th century Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, was not culturally nor 
politically rooted in the United States. During his extended visit, he was able 
to critically observe from a safe empirical distance and assess how the 
American system of government functions, as an independent observer with 
the outlook of an upper class, educated European. Traveling over 3,000 miles 
to conduct a “field study” of another nation’s governmental structure for 
several months was not a common endeavor at the time, which added to the 
singularity of his experience and to the richness of his perspective.  
Through features like accidental causes, the laws, and the manners and 
customs of the people, America has been able to sustain a balance between 
democracy and elitism, according to the French aristocrat and author of 
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Democracy in America, a two-volume piece that continues to offer uncannily 
accurate and profound insight on American politics and culture to this day. 
Tocqueville cited factors like geographic location as one accidental cause, 
with its abundance of resources and vastness of land, which by nature fosters 
development and expansion of a nation. Furthermore, America was isolated 
on an enormous territory, free from competing or enemy states. This meant 
that Americans did not have to allot resources to distinguish themselves 
through military accomplishments – though we do today – which, according 
to Tocqueville, played a significant role in the nation’s motivation. More 
precisely, he argued that aggregating political influence in one community by 
placing one city above others would cause abuse of power and selfish, 
impulsive pursuit of a majority-led agenda. Prioritizing one metropolis over 
other towns would also be “a serious injury to the representative system; and 
it exposes modern republics to the same defect as the republics of antiquity,” 
he contended.  
Another favorable circumstance for a representative republic that 
Tocqueville found in America was the “equality of condition” everyone was 
born with. This was considering an essential component of a functional 
democratic republic, which was conceived at the arrival of New England 
settlers, who were mostly equal in socioeconomic status. The early settlers left 
the laws of inheritance on the shores of England, which rendered it “difficult 
for families to preserve their ancestral domains … [compelled] them in some 
measure to cooperate with the law.” And equal division of property became 
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more widespread, and henceforth “reduced all to one level.” When everyone 
begins life in similar economic circumstances, equalization of social condition 
occurs and the expectation of equal rights develops. This affects the political 
framework, because more citizens expect to participate and fewer anticipate to 
solely be governed by others. It is imperative to underscore that to 
Tocqueville at the time, equality of condition did not apply to women or 
people of color, but to property-owner white males. 
Another attribute that helps maintain a democratic republic is the laws of 
the land, Tocqueville added. This consists of the federal union, township 
institutions, and judicial power, which manage to “check and direct impulses 
of the majority without stopping its activity.” Tocqueville listed education as 
another “equalizing” factor in the American republic, spreading basic 
knowledge and skills to a broad spectrum of people, not just the privileged 
aristocracy, as in 18th century France. Education provides greater access to 
jobs, avenues for civic engagement, and access to public forums and the press. 
This then fosters a sort of practical knowledge and ingenuity Americans 
channel into the public sphere, which Tocqueville admired.  
One of the overriding dangers of a democratic republic that discomforted 
Tocqueville was the unlimited power of the majority. This power is bolstered 
by the notion that American people respect the majority, either out of political 
virtue – patriotism – or personal interest. The latter essentially means “all 
parties are willing to recognize the rights of the majority, because they all 
hope at some time to be able to exercise them to their own advantage.” In 
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other words, citizens willingly accept the force of a majority and acknowledge 
its authority because they believe it will enable them to exercise their own 
political will and social agency in the future – a social contract, of sorts. The 
turbulence resulting from the transient nature of legislation and the 
administration may lead to a tyranny of the majority. It is useful to recall that 
to Tocqueville’s immediate readership, democracy mostly equated with 
anarchy, and his intellectual quest entailed understanding why democracy in 
America works. First, he offered that because legislatures change 
representatives annually and the authority of the law is supreme, the 
legislatures are injected with an extra dose of power, making them more prone 
to abuse it. This reminds us why a balance of power is so crucial among the 
branches of government – each department keeps the other in check, thereby 
preventing rampant corruption overall (ideally). Another danger of an overly 
powerful majority is the impact it has on public opinion, Tocqueville 
maintained. As he phrased it, “In America the majority raises formidable 
barriers around the liberty of opinion; within the barriers an author may write 
what he pleases, but woe to him, if he goes beyond them.” This illustrates that 
while there is a relative degree of freedom in thought and expression in 
America, there are also restrictions beyond which it is socially expensive to 
trespass.  
Still, one of Tocqueville’s central observations regarding American 
democracy centered on the freedom to form associations – a pivotal way for 
Americans to escape the tyranny of the majority. He marveled, at times even 
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gently mocked, how Americans have an insatiable inclination to form groups, 
organizations, committees – civil associations of all types and sizes – for even 
the most trivial purposes. Associations give assent to certain doctrines, 
allowing them to be promoted above others in the public sphere. As he 
explicated,  
In no country in the world has the principle of association been more 
successfully used, or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in 
America. Besides the permanent associations, which are established by 
law, under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number 
of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private 
individuals. 13 
 
As the abovementioned quotation illustrates, it is by the people’s own will – 
not anyone else’s pressure -- that they form such an array of associations. 
Tocqueville reasoned that this tendency to form associations is an 
outlet for expression as well as one of the leading safeguards against the 
tyranny of the majority, a concept he considered one of the greatest perils for 
democratic societies. As he phrased it, “At the present time, the liberty of 
association has become a necessary guaranty against the tyranny of the 
majority.” Tocqueville asserted that the freedom to associate is not only a 
protection but also a necessity for a democratic government, in which the 
opinion of the majority prevails and the views of the minority can get eclipsed 
without enough prudence. To ground in evidence, “There are no countries in 
which associations are more needed, to prevent the despotism of faction or the 
                                                        
13
 71 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
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arbitrary power of the prince, than those which are democratically 
constituted.” 14 
Tocqueville claimed that associations are needed more in democracies 
than in monarchies, since in the latter, the minority is not only protected but 
reigns absolute. In a democratic society, however, minorities do not have as 
much power and find an outlet for their discontents by forming associations. 
This bolsters their effectiveness, rendering them visible to those in positions 
of power. What they cannot achieve on their own becomes feasible in a group 
of like-minded people. Sometimes combining their individual strengths and 
efforts toward a mutual goal yields results that exceed citizens’ expectations 
about their own capabilities to produce societal change. As Tocqueville stated, 
“Citizens who are individually powerless do not very clearly anticipate the 
strength which they may acquire by uniting together.” 15 As this connotes, 
public associations are integral to a democratic nation, since individuals do 
not possess enough resources and clout on their own. Citizens cannot advance 
any cause if they do not learn to voluntarily help one another, Tocqueville 
contended. Since they cannot force their fellow men to execute a task, citizens 
must learn to willingly cooperate for mutual gain.  
                                                        
14
 74 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
 
15
 191 74 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew 
Hacker. New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
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Establishing associations remains the minority’s only route toward 
budging the status quo, which is why this liberty is so fundamental to prevent 
abuses of power by the majority, Tocqueville maintained. To substantiate, 
In America, the citizens who form the minority associate, in order, 
first, to show their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral 
power of the majority; and, secondly, to stimulate competition, and 
thus to discover those arguments which are most fitted to act upon the 
majority: for they always entertain hopes of drawing over the majority 
to their own side, and then disposing of the supreme power in its 
name. 16 
 
As this excerpt stresses, forming associations allows citizens to show the 
majority that opposing viewpoints exist and present alternatives to current 
conditions. Moreover, they generate the proliferation and competition of 
ideas, which enables the minority to select the argument or strategy that offers 
the strongest likelihood of coaxing the majority to their side.  
By virtue of this behavior, associations acknowledge that they do not 
represent the majority, Tocqueville wrote. Suffrage, voting for the majority, 
crystallizes this notion and is respected in American society. To exemplify, 
many citizens may disapprove of President Barack Obama’s policies, whether 
domestic or foreign, but few informed citizens would argue that he does not 
hold executive power or that he received this authority illegitimately. He was 
the clear winner of a national election, and therefore his post embodies 
popular will, or the majority’s stance on the choice of presidential candidate. 
In effect, associations, reflecting a minority position, know they are up against 
                                                        
16
 75 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
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a bigger tide. After all, if the minority “…did represent the preponderating 
power, they would change the law instead of soliciting its reform.” 17 
Citizens who join associations realize they must obey the law to 
preserve their legal rights and enjoy living in a civil society, which is why 
Tocqueville stated, “the right of association may remain unrestrained without 
evil consequences” in America. There is widespread public understanding that 
while laws constrain liberty to an extent, they also enable citizens to exercise 
the prerogatives characteristic of a democratic society – like the freedom to 
associate. But these freedoms are only protected if the citizens follow the laws 
of the land. The American citizenry realizes it is in every person’s interest to 
uphold the laws. More exactly, “The citizen looks upon the fortune of the 
public as his own, and he labors for the good of the State, not merely from a 
sense of pride or duty, but from what I venture to term cupidity.” He asserted 
that in the United States, nearly everyone (again, those who are privileged 
enough to vote at the time) exercises the elective franchise, which may shed 
light on why the American public feels a sense of ownership toward the laws 
and other public goods. 18 Tocqueville concluded that in a participatory 
political system like a democracy, governments should not be the only active 
powers. Associations ought to stand in lieu of those powerful private 
                                                        
17
 76 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
 
18
 84 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
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individuals whom equality of conditions has swept away. To buttress this 
concept, 
If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating 
together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the 
equality of conditions is increased. 19 
 
 Today, however, it remains a question whether the rise of the 
corporate state, the subject of the next section, has not brought inequality of 
economic and political conditions back – disproportionately tilting in favor of 
those in positions of immense wealth.  
 
Chapter III 
The Rise of the Corporate State 
 
As Parenti contends in Democracy For the Few, although 
governmental decisions are frequently made in the name of national interest, 
they rarely benefit everyone those decisions may have an impact on. Defining 
public policy proves challenging when only a portion of the electorate makes 
key decisions. To support this claim, 
A major difficulty that exists within the democratic process regarding 
the definition of the public interest is that often very few groups and 
individuals participate in the process of defining the public interest in 
particular policy areas. The broader electorate does not have the 
information, motivation, or time to involve itself in every area of 
public policy. 20 
                                                        
19
 185 De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Andrew Hacker. 
New     York: Washington Square, 1964. Print. 
 
20 9 Woll, Peter. Public Policy. Cambridge: Winthrop, 1974. Print. 
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In truth, the political system seems to cater to the interests of those 
who can exert the most political pressure – something that takes connections 
and financial resources to accomplish. To substantiate, “some portion of the 
populace, often the majority, loses out. What is considered national policy is 
usually the policy of dominant groups strategically located within the political 
system.”  The political system primarily responds to the influences and needs 
of the corporate community, and this section explicates this development in 
American history. As Parenti highlights by referencing President Calvin 
Coolidge, too often “’the business of government is business.’” 21 Even during 
the period of “Jacksonian democracy,” supposedly the era of the common 
man, the upper-class dominance of public – often political – that was 
characteristic of the founding fathers’ generation I alluded to earlier, 
continued into the 19th century and on.  As Peter Woll asserts in Public Policy, 
“For most of the nineteenth century it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
public policy served the economic interests of selected groups in the private 
sector.” Specifically, Jackson’s key appointments were mostly picked from 
the wealthiest ranks and his policies typically reflected those interests, as 
Parenti argues.  
 Meanwhile, the laboring class of the 19th century – which may be 
mirrored in some ways by the middle and working classes today – struggled 
                                                        
21
 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St. 
Martin's, 1983. Print. 
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with atrocious working conditions, including long shifts, minimal or below-
wage pay, and unsanitary conditions. These intolerable conditions sparked the 
railroad, farmers’, and industrial strikes of the 1870s, 1880, and 1890s, 
respectively. When the government would step in to respond, “it was almost 
invariably on the side of the wealthy element against the working class.” To 
be precise, civil authorities would energetically defend the capitalist interests, 
crushing workers’ strikes by using measures like the police and state militia 
and later federal troops. 22 
By the dawn of the Civil War, the law was remodeled to the advantage 
of commerce and industry, at the expense of farmers, consumers, workers, and 
other groups with less political and economic resources. The law of “eminent 
domain,” for example, facilitated the government in seizing farmers’ land and 
redistributing it as subsidies to canal and railroad companies.  
Like during the 19th century, the affluent men of the 20th century relied 
on the central government to do for them what they could not individually, 
including: repress democratic forces, limit competition, regulate the market to 
their own merit, and in other ways fuel the process of capital accumulation, 
Parenti maintains. To illustrate this idea,  
During the 1900-1916 period, known as the Progressive Era, federal 
price and market regulations in meat packing, food and drugs, 
banking, timber, and mining were initiated at the insistence of the 
strongest companies within these industries. 23 
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As the abovementioned quotation shows, powerful companies within leading 
national industries lobbied their interests and aimed to sway federal decision-
making even back in the dubiously termed “Progressive” Era.  
 In this period, the several men who occupied the presidency were 
faithful collaborators of big business. Teddy Roosevelt’s major legislative 
proposals, for instance, echoed corporate interests, as did those of subsequent 
presidents like Taft and Wilson. Any legal gains for labor were “wrestled 
from fiercely resistant elites by democratic forces after bitter and sometimes 
bloody struggle. Even with these victories, the conditions of labor remained 
far from good.” 24 To ground in facts, millions of people continued to work 
12- to 14-hour days, real wages were lower in 1914 than in the 1890s, and 2 
million children -- reported – were still compelled to work to supplement the 
family income. One can argue that this can be paralleled to the manner in 
which our government today pushes forward policies that may benefit oil 
companies but pose grave dangers toward the environment, security, and the 
health of the average American. 
 With the onset of World War I, relations between industry and 
government grew more intimate still, after President Woodrow Wilson 
revoked the policy of American neutrality in 1915, entering the war allegedly 
to “defend American interests” and “to make the world safer for democracy.” 
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25
 (This is eerily similar to the patriotic rhetoric utilized by the Bush 
administration to legitimize to the American public and the world the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, some critics may note.) Allied purchases of munitions 
and supplies became a major source of profit and industrial production for the 
U.S. The war presented the authorities with another justification to strengthen 
the oppression of labor. To strengthen this claim,  
The war helped quell class conflict at home by focusing people’s 
attention on the menace of the ‘barbarian Huns’ of Germany, who 
supposedly threatened Anglo-American civilization. Patriotic feelings 
ran high as Americans were exhorted to make sacrifices for the war 
effort. Strikes were now treated as seditious interference with war 
production. 26 
 
Again, this took a toll on ordinary families: in 1916, workers’ wages 
could not feed families. About 35,000 were killed on the job every year, with 
700,000 suffering injury, blindness, illness or other work-related disabilities. 
During the “normalcy” of the 1920s, when prosperity was supposedly within 
everyone’s reach, many continued to struggle, Parenti underlined.  
When the stock market crashed in 1929, millions plunged into poverty 
and economic hardship. The crash exacerbated living conditions for those who 
were barely making it as it were. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, a 
third of the nation was ill fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed, with at least another 
third barely getting by. Like in the late 19th century, these dire economic 
conditions prompted a series of strikes across the country. Eventually, F. D. 
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Roosevelt’s New Deal brought some victories for the working class: minimum 
wage reform, the eight-hour workday, the right for labor unions to organize, 
and the Social Security and unemployment compensation legislation won by 
the labor-led coalitions of the 1930s. But as Parenti emphasized, this era was 
hardly a triumph for the “forgotten man” – these reforms were rather “giant 
stepping stones that put working people on higher ground from which to 
continue struggling.” 27 It was not the hardship of millions that instigated this 
government assistance and intervention, but the threat of civil unrest that labor 
strikes across the nation generated. The corporate state sought to contain class 
struggle and calm political unrest, giving “a little to keep a lot,” much like 
Tocqueville presciently thought the function free associations would serve to 
resist the tyranny of faction. 
 As Senator Mike Gravel argues in his book, Citizen Power, the 
interests of business and government merged further still with World War II 
and the onset of the Cold War. They found a common purpose in the nation’s 
obsession to prevent the proliferation of communist ideas with the expansion 
of our military power and influence aboard. Gravel contends that “true social 
progress was being starved to feed the military machine” during this time 28. 
But when abuses become very personalized – whether they entail 
discrepancies in the distribution of wealth, enlistment in criminal wars like 
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Vietnam, or excessive government repression during civil rights movement 
and the black revolution – even a highly apolitical public can and does 
challenge the power structure. This is a breaking point in the tolerance level of 
the masses, when the general public decides to stand up to the power elites to 
defend their own rights and needs, Gravel explains. Still, the vast majority of 
America’s wealth – and in turn, most policymaking – is owned by these 
powerful elites, not a broad middle class that may occasionally channel its 
built-up frustrations and discontents in the form of strikes or protests. In fact, 
most of the time “middle-income people are finding it increasingly hard to 
maintain a middle-class standard of living.” 29 
 In turn, this “superclass” – as David Rothkopf labels these powerful 
elites that steer much of the country’s course – seek to preserve the privileges 
they reap from the positions they occupy in our society and are far from 
interested in re-examining the way wealth is organized and used in this 
country. As Parenti states, “It is corporate power that prevents both a 
reordering of our priorities and a move toward a healthier, more equitable 
society.” 30 After all, why modify a system that runs so smoothly to advance 
one’s agenda? This powerful, wealthy “superclass” is content with the 
privileges its occupation comes with. Contradistinctively, the average voter 
has become more apathetic and disillusioned with a political process that 
consistently disregards his or her voice, the focus of the following section.  
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Chapter IV 
Undemocratic Democracy, or How the Increased Corporate Influence in 
the Political Process Has Thwarted Accountable Policymaking and 
Disengaged the Average Voter 
 
 When one feels like one is ignored or one’s input has no effect, he or 
she is less inclined to contribute to the conversation – this rationale pertains to 
politics and a classroom setting alike. To exemplify, if I get the sense that my 
professor does not care about my perspective or even discourages me from 
participating in class discussion, I am far less likely to raise my hand and 
express my opinion in the lecture hall. In sharp contrast, a professor that 
invites students to articulate their opinions on a more equal platform than the 
traditional professor-lecturing-students scenario will probably stimulate a 
robust exchange of ideas and engagement from his or her pupils. The students 
may call for change in the classroom dynamic, offering their takes on various 
issues to make the most out of their learning opportunity. But it is up to the 
professor to acknowledge and approve of this dynamic shift between students 
and faculty, since the professor occupies the leadership role. In this section, I 
scrutinize how the ballooning corporate influence in the political process -- 
which stems from the rise of the corporate state -- has thwarted representative 
and accountable policymaking, distancing the average American citizen from 
active participation in civic life.  
 When Senator Mike Gravel recounted his travels across the country in 
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the ‘70s, he said he saw mounting public dissatisfaction, frustration, and 
anger. Americans across the nation were demanding more economic security, 
more social benefits and safeguards, more personal freedom, and more control 
over the decision-making process, he described. To better visualize,  
Sitting in that Harlem street academy in the middle of neglected 
America, I could readily understand why the idea of ‘citizen power’ 
was greeted with contempt when I raised the subject. ... They had only 
to look out the window to see a street – their street – littered with 
debris, where crime and poverty were daily facts of life. They had no 
jobs, no money, nothing to call their own. 31 
 
With the balance of power resting in the hands of the government, business, 
and organized labor, the common man has become excluded from the 
decision-making process 32. He links this to money – politics have become an 
exponentially expensive arena to penetrate. The cards are now in favor of 
those who either use personal wealth to become the lawmakers, or those who 
donate enough for existing lawmakers and special interest groups to advance 
their interests. To substantiate, “Not every important political leader is rich 
but many are, and those who are not are usually beholden to moneyed 
interests.” 33 Moreover, “Since World War II, almost all presidential 
candidates on the Democratic and Republican tickets have been millionaires 
either at the time they first campaigned for the office or by the time they 
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departed from it.” 34 To add precision, G. William Domhoff underlines in 
Who Rules America? that politicians are from the top 10 to 15 percent of the 
occupational and income ladders – particularly those who hold the highest 
elective offices. 35 
Either way, the current framework reinforces the power of those 
already powerful economically, and as a result, politically. As Gravel wrote, 
“The reliance on personal fortunes or massive contributions from special 
interest groups naturally tends to perpetuate in power those who are allied 
with corporate and other big-money interests.” 36 To offer more concrete 
detail, the cost of conducting a political campaign increased 100 percent over 
the past 15 years and skyrocketed 50 percent in just the years between 1964 
and 1968 – a 1972 statistic, though the concept may resonate more today than 
ever. It cost an average of $5 million to win a Senate seat in 2002. Just since 
1989, one sector of the economy – finance, insurance, and real estate sector – 
contributed more than $1 billion to federal candidates and political parties. 37 
As this suggests, those who cannot afford to run a costly election campaign 
will be unable to run for office. In effect, this system excludes citizens who do 
not have enough money or do not obtain it from wealthy donors, rendering an 
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enormous segment of the population politically silent. Parenti expressed a 
similar sentiment: “One of the many ways the ruling class exercises its 
influence over the democratic process is by expending large sums of money to 
influence elections.” 38 
One may wonder what makes elections so expensive, but one only has 
to consider the following expenditures to understand the costs involved: 
broadcasting, television and radio advertising, professional pollsters, 
managers, public relations firms, and advertising companies. All of these 
expenditures are necessary to run competitive campaigns, because fellow 
political candidates – who may be running for the same office – are sure to 
utilize these prevalent communication techniques to boost their chances of 
winning over their constituents. Failing to use any of these strategies and 
resources is a disadvantage for any politician, because others will. This brings 
us to the topic of campaign finance, or how elections are presently run. As 
Gravel depicts,  
Under the present system of financing of campaigns exclusively from 
private funds, the candidate who does not have great personal wealth 
must raise the large sums required for a successful campaign by 
relying on large contributions or loans from a monied elite composed 
of corporate executives and directors, financiers, professional 
entertainers, labor leaders, and individuals with family and inherited 
wealth. 39 
 
Unsurprisingly, these generous contributors may expect something in return 
for their financial contributions. As Parenti somewhat sarcastically puts it,  
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If it should happen, however, that after the election the big contributor 
finds himself or his firm burdened by a problem that only the White 
House can handle, he sees no reason why he shouldn’t be allowed to 
exercise his right like any other citizen and ask his elected 
representative, who in this case happens to be his friend, the president 
of the United States, for a little help. 40 
 
 Like most business transactions, the wealthy donors perceive these 
contributions as investments, for which they should benefit after the fact. 
More often than not, that is precisely what takes place – elected officials end 
up listening to and responding to the interests of these affluent contributors 
much more readily than “Joe the Plumber” who donates $10 toward a given 
political campaign. As a result, “What they want, and what they usually get, 
are elected officials who are beholden to them and inclined to be sympathetic 
and responsive to their interests and needs.” 41 For example, the Nixon 
administration helped settle a multibillion-dollar antitrust suit against ITT in 
return for a $400,000 donation. Furthermore, one of President Reagan’s first 
acts involved deregulating heating oil and gasoline prices – a $50 billion 
“gift” to the oil companies in return for more than $200 million they 
contributed to his 1980 campaign. What this demonstrates is a political 
structure built on financial base, either personal or acquired for a hefty 
economic and political price.  
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 It is not surprising, then, that many voters now view elections as an 
elaborate theatrical circus, in which they are growing tired of the quality of the 
candidates, the lack of real choice, the absence of real issues, the numerous 
primaries, and the “vast expenditures of campaign funds.” 42 Ever since the 
1974 Federal Election Campaign Act, supported by court decisions and 
Federal Election Campaign rulings, corporations have been given the green 
light to form political action committees (PACs) that can solicit contributions 
from stockholders and company employees – from managers on down – and 
can spend as much as they wish on their preferred candidates 43. This spurred 
an explosion of corporate PACs: 776 in 1978, 954 in 1980, and 1327 in 1982 -
- “and a dramatic increase in big-business contributions.” 44  
 Some may think only corrupt politicians are susceptible to this 
influence, but one only has to look at the pervasive nature of money in politics 
to acknowledge this is far from reality. “’Everyone has a price,’ Howard 
Hughes once told an associate who later recalled that the billionaire handed 
out about $400,000 yearly” to councilmen, county supervisors, tax assessors, 
sheriffs, state senators, assemblymen, district attorneys, governors, 
congressmen and senators, judges, and even vice-presidents and presidents in 
the late 1970s . To phrase otherwise, 
                                                        
42 199 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St. 
Martin's, 1983. Print. 
43 230 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St. 
Martin's, 1983. Print. 
44 230-231 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: 
St. Martin's, 1983. Print. 
32 
 
 
The temptation for corporate interests to use large sums of money to 
win decisions that bring in vastly larger sums is strong…especially 
since those who would be the guardians of the law themselves have 
their palms out or are in other ways beholden to the corrupting powers. 
Politicians too face a competitive market, and their campaign expenses 
are burdensome. To avoid yielding to the special interests, to refuse to 
take from the haves, is to turn oneself into a have-not and lower one’s 
chances of political survival. 45 
 
Corporate money seems to have become an elementary part of politics, and to 
refuse it without drastically restructuring the current system of election 
financing may well equate to political suicide. 
Many large corporations now have special departments dedicated to 
performing favors for office holders. It may shock some, but “the services 
include everything from free Caribbean trips on private jet planes to loans, 
private contracts, and illegal gifts.” 46 The American Petroleum Institute -- an 
organization of gas, oil, and petrochemical companies -- allocates $75 million 
annually in lobbying efforts in Washington and has at least a dozen full-time 
lobbyists. In 1979, the oil industry employed over 600 people to lobby 
Congress and government agencies. Money is paramount for lobbying 
lawmakers. As one House aide said, money purchases ‘basic ingredient of all 
lobbying’ – accessibility to the officeholder and, with that, the opportunity to 
shape his or her judgments with arguments of the lobbyist’s own choosing.” 47 
Most of the public may have no idea what their state representative are doing, 
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but banks, land developers, utilities, and manufacturers regularly 
communicate with them, inundating them with campaign contributions, legal 
retainers, special-term “loans,” and investment advice. To solidify this 
concept,  
Congress produces an array of grants, subsidies, leases, franchises, 
inkind supports, direct services, noncompetitive contracts, loan 
guarantees, loss compensations, and other forms of public largesse to 
private business…that same Congress cut food programs for infants 
and senior citizens, assistance programs for the disabled, home-care 
and therapy programs for the inform and handicapped, and medical 
care, job, and housing programs for the poor and elderly. 48 
 
Subservience to business is so widespread, that it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish the politicians from the lobbyists. 49 
As a result of this corporate grip on politics, then, we have been seeing 
“decline in party apparatus, an increase in free-for-all primary contests, and an 
ever greater dependency on big contributors to pay for individualized staffs 
and costly media campaigns.” 50Since money is needed to run election 
campaigns, a process all officeholders undergo, campaign finance is not – or 
should not be – a partisan issue. Both parties tend to ‘”reflect an upper-class 
tendency,’ not surprisingly, since ordinary working people rarely have the 
time and money that would enable them to participate.” 51 Gravel contends 
that this results in the very public disenchantment that has alienated many 
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American citizens from civic life, “The growing disaffection with the political 
process can be traced directly to the powerlessness of our people, the 
unresponsiveness of our parties, and the increasing control of our lives by a 
monied elite.” 52 In the last section of this paper, I offer some solutions to this 
pressing issue, basing my convictions on secondary research and two years of 
experience as an intern for nonprofit organization Democracy Matters.  
 
Chapter V 
 Solutions: Campaign Finance Reform and Political Youth Activism 
 In the 2010 landmark Citizens United ruling, the Supreme Court held 
that corporations are legal entities that deserve the same First Amendment 
protections as private citizens in relation to political speech, in the form of 
financial contributions to political campaigns. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court:  
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political 
speech, the government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored 
speakers," he wrote. "The court has recognized that First Amendment 
protection extends to corporations. 
 
This decision, approved by a 5-4 margin, blurred the distinction 
between corporate and individual spending, overturning a 22-year-old 
Supreme Court decision that barred corporations from spending unlimited 
financial resources to support or oppose candidates. Furthermore, it nullified 
part of the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law that prohibited 
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political advertisements financed by corporations or unions from being 
broadcast or transmitted 30 days before a presidential primary and 60 days 
before the general election. Some limitations remain. For example, 
corporations still cannot contribute directly to federal candidates or national 
party committees, a ban that dates to 1907. Other restrictions, including 
disclosure requirements for nonprofit organizations that champion for political 
candidates, still apply. But overall, by striking down limits on expenditures by 
corporations that are not formally associated with candidates’ campaigns, the 
court effectively aggrandized the role of special interests in politics, many 
critics and government watchdog groups believe. One of the first critics to 
denounce this ruling was President Obama, who said in an official statement: 
The Supreme Court has given a green light to a new stampede of 
special interest money in our politics … It is a major victory for big 
oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other 
powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to 
drown out the voices of everyday Americans. 53 
 Like Hankin points out in Making Democracy Work, “A corporation 
differs from an individual in that, as one wag has put it, ‘it has no body to be 
kicked and no soul to be damned.’ But the law finds it convenient to deal with 
it as a person – though a fictitious one – in many ways.” 54 In actuality, it is 
quite simple to discern that a corporation differs from an individual citizen in 
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countless ways, beginning with the fact that most Americans do not stand 
behind a comparable network of powerful connections and financial resources 
that a corporation does. It logically seems inequitable, then, to extend the 
same legal prerogatives to an already powerful entity while indirectly 
reducing the potential of the average voter to exercise his or her political 
voice. This only works to institutionalize the existing political and economic 
inequalities in American society, limiting the very concept of public interest.  
As Woll remarked in the 1970s, 
If more of the public at large could be involved in the process of policy 
formulation then the public interest would be defined differently. But 
so far the mechanisms of our democracy have not been able to bring 
wider public participation into the process of policy formulation. 55 
  
 One viable alternative to the status quo is campaign finance reform, 
today most comprehensively embodied by the Fair Elections Now Act, a bill 
co-sponsored by Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin. This piece of 
legislation seeks to enable candidates to choose to run for congressional office 
without relying on large contributions, big money bundlers, or donations from 
lobbyists. Senator Gravel observed over four decades ago that, “We have to 
democratize our elections, and we can do this only if we provide federal 
subsidies for both presidential and congressional election campaigns.” 56 As 
this quotation denotes, one vehicle for this potential change is the public 
financing of election campaigns, otherwise known as “clean elections” or “fair 
elections.” This reform is a primary and necessary step in returning control of 
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the government to the people, and it is the only method to halt the auctioning 
of American elections to the highest private bidder, as Gravel underscores:  
A people’s platform, therefore, must insist on the public financing of 
elections to help ensure that our elected officials are not unduly 
inhibited or excessively influenced by the real and imagined 
obligations which accompany large private campaign contributions. 57 
Under this voluntary system, qualified candidates could received 
donations of $100 or less, with would be matched by government funds. This 
way, ordinary Americans can run for office without leaning on wealthy 
special interests to enter – and win – a political race. Instead, candidates 
would be able to organize grassroots campaigns and spend a larger chunk of 
their time on the campaign trail communicating with their constituents, rather 
than “dialing for dollars.” Importantly, public financing would permit average 
voters to connect with politicians and express their perspectives. The playing 
field of politics could also be levelled, allowing more diverse candidates in, 
thereby enriching the scope of the competition and choice for voters. 
Uncontested elections would be less frequent, more challengers and diverse 
candidates would enter the political scence, and together this would present 
voters with more choice and incentive to participate in civic life. Conjointly, 
this would restore public confidence in the electoral system, because voters 
would appreciate that elected officials are more responsive and accountable to 
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their needs, rather that strangled by the corporate stronghold. 58 
Public financing schemes have proven to work effectively. This is 
evident in states like Maine, Arizona and Connecticut. Specifically, in 2006, 
Arizona elected "clean" candidates as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Attorney General, and other state-wide offices. Voter turnout rose from 64 
percent in 1996 to 77 percent in 2004. The number of Native American and 
Latino candidates also tripled between 2000 and 2002. In Maine, 85 percent of 
the seats in the state legislature in 2008 were occupied by candidates who ran 
with public financing – owing their allegiance to nobody except their 
constituents.  An attractive element in this turbulent economic climate is that 
public financing of all state elections has not cost taxpayers any money. The 
system is mostly funded by a levy on criminal and civil penalties, and 
voluntary contributions. In reality, taxpayers would save money if politicians 
were not sponsored by special interests in return for tax breaks, special favors, 
and government bailouts. The Democracy Matters Institute estimates that 
public financing at the federal level would cost taxpayers less than $10 -- a 
negligent price to pay for a more representative and robust democracy. 59 
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 The impact of involving young people in this cause and political life 
generally cannot be underestimated, a claim I can attest to thanks to my 
experience of interning with Democracy Matters and serving as the president 
and founder of the Syracuse University chapter of this nonprofit organization 
for the past two years. Whether by initiating and coordinating a 55-student trip 
to the Washington, D.C., rallies in October of 2010, organizing a lobby visit to 
State Senator Valesky, or by penning letters to Governor Andrew Cuomo, I 
have seen with my own eyes that grassroots campaigns can mobilize students 
and even elicit response from elected officials. This bipartisan organization 
advocates reducing corporate influence in politics by involving college 
students in politics, unveiling a platform for students of all interests and 
concerns to relate on. Established by Colgate University student and NBA 
player Adonal Foyle in 2001 to give students a bigger voice on important 
issues, this organization rallies for the public financing of elections across the 
country, to fight the corporate takeover of democracy in America. The 
mobilization of citizenry is instrumental in enacting any change in American 
society, a time-tested reality our history books reveal when summarizing the 
course of events of civic rights movements, for instance. It is a force of great 
potential magnitude, and it can be tapped into by sacrificing some of your 
time and effort toward advancing a more participatory system of government 
– the lifeblood of American democracy we have the obligation to sustain.  
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